eMudhra Intermediate CA Compromise

EMudhra-knäckningen är värre än Heartbleed

Underskatta aldrig den mänskliga faktorn.

The compromised eMudhra keys were defective at a level that’s challenging the imagination of many of the engineers studying the incident. A normal size for a NIST P-384 elliptic curve cryptography private key contains roughly 384 bits of entropy, a size allowing almost 2^384, or a number with 116 digits, different possibilities. The private key sizes of the compromised keys ranged from 3 to 8 bits. Astonishingly, the private keys were 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237.

“That is extremely in the ‘this should not be possible’ category,” Valdorda said. “Maybe some horribly dangerous key generation interface has a ‘size’ parameter and they set it to 1 by mistake???”

Ben Cartwright-Cox, director of BGP.tools, said: “My guess is that it’s example code that accidentally leaked to production, but hard to know. But it’s bonkers that no one noticed.”